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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Beverly A. Pinard appeals from the district court's order denying her 
motion to expunge or reduce her burglary conviction. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Pinard stole beer, wine, and cigarettes from a Shell gas station. (R., p.5.) 
The state charged Pinard with burglary and petty theft, and Pinard pied guilty to 
both charges. (R., pp.14-16, 22-23.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of four years with two years fixed for the burglary charge, but retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.22-23.) Upon completion of the retained jurisdiction period, 
the district court suspended execution of the sentence and placed Pinard on 
supervised probation for two years. (R., pp.29-34.) 
Approximately six months later, Pinard admitting breaking curfew, 
associating with an individual contrary to her probation officer's order, and using 
marijuana, all in violation of her probation. (R., pp.37-48.) The district court 
revoked Pinard's probation but retained jurisdiction for a second time. (R., pp.50-
53.) After the conclusion of the second period of retained jurisdiction, the district 
court suspended execution of the sentence and placed Pinard back on 
supervised probation for five years. (R, pp.57-62.) After three years without a 
violation, the district court discharged Pinard from supervised probation and 
placed her on unsupervised probation. (R., pp.63-67.) 
Three years after Pinard completed her unsupervised probation, she filed 
a motion asking the district court to "expunge" her burglary conviction or reduce it 
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a misdemeanor. (R., p.68.) 
Pinard had not "at times" r>Ar1n.-.t1 
the motion after finding 
terms of her probation, and 
was thus not eligible for dismissal or reduction under I.C. § 19-2604(1) or (2). 




Pinard states the issue on appeal as: 
Mindful that Ms. Pinard is not eligible for relief because the district 
court found that she had violated the terms of her probation, did the 
district court err when it failed to reduce her felony to a 
misdemeanor or expunge her conviction? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Pinard failed to show that the district court erred in denying her 
motion to expunge or reduce her burglary conviction? 
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Pinard Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying Her Motion 
To "Expunge" Or Reduce Her Burglary Conviction 
A. Introduction 
While acknowledging that she is "not eligible for relief' under the 
controlling law, Pinard still contends that the district court erred in denying her 
motion to "expunge" or reduce her burglary conviction. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) Pinard is correct that she is not entitled to relief, as the district 
court properly applied I.C. § 19-2604(1) and (2)1 in denying her motion to 
"expunge" or reduce her burglary conviction. 
B. The District Court Properly Applied I.C. § 19-2604 (1) And (2) In Denying 
Pinard's Motion To "Expunge" Or Reduce Her Burglary Conviction 
At the time of Pinard's motion and the district court's ruling on it, a district 
court had the discretion, under some circumstances, to dismiss a criminal 
conviction, I.C. § 19-2604(1), or to reduce a felony conviction to a misdemeanor, 
I.C § 19-2604(2), after a defendant completed probation. In order to be eligible 
for relief under either subsection, a defendant had to show, among other things, 
1 Subsequent to the district court's April 25, 2011 denial of Pinard's motion, I.C § 
19-2604 was amended. S.L. 2011, ch. 187 § 1. Effective July 31, 2011, I.C § 
19-2604 no longer requires a defendant to show that he or she has "at all times" 
complied with probation in order to be eligible for dismissal or reduction of a 
conviction under that statute. Instead, l.C § 19-2604(1) now gives the district 
court the discretion to dismiss a conviction or reduce a felony conviction to a 
misdemeanor if there was no court finding or defendant admission, in any 
probation violation proceeding, of a probation vblation. While Pinard, who 
admitted violating probation at a probation violation proceeding, would still 
not be eligible for relief under the current statute, this brief refers to the former 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) (2) force at the time of Pinard's motion and the district 
court's ruling on ft. 
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that he or she "has at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon 
which he [or she] was p!aced on probation." I C. § 19-2604(1 ), (2). 
Idaho Code§ 19-2604(1) and (2) thus create an "extraordinary remedy for 
a defendant who has strictly adhered to the terms of probation." State v. 
Schumacher, 141 Idaho 484, 486, 959 P.2d 465, 467 (Ct. App. 1998). Indeed, 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) and (2) are unambiguous, and their plain language clearly 
requires a defendant's compliance with the terms and conditions of probation "at 
all times" in order to be eligible for dismissal of her conviction. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized as much in State v. Schwartz, 139 
Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719 (2003). In Schwartz, a district court placed a felony DUI 
defendant on probation and granted him a withheld judgment. M.:. at 361, 79 P.3d 
at 720. After the defendant violated his probation, the district court revoked the 
withheld judgment, and retained jurisdiction. M.:. After the period of retained 
jurisdiction, the court suspended the balance of the sentence and placed the 
defendant back on probation. kl The defendant satisfactorily complied with all 
of the terms and conditions of this second period of probation, and then 
unsuccessfully moved to amend his judgment to a misdemeanor pursuant to I. C. 
§ 19-2604(2). kl 
The defendant appealed, but the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, stating: 
The statute in this case is clear. The defendant must have 
"at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his 
probation." The phrase "at all times" means just that. A defendant 
who has at any time failed to do what he or she was required to do 
while on probation in a particular case has not at all times complied 
with the terms and conditions of his or her probation in that case. 
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!d. at 362, 79 P.3d at 721. See also State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 
102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) ("In 
[Schwartz], we stated that those words meant just what they said ... The statute 
requires that defendant has 'complied' with his conditions of probation. It does 
not state that he must have obeyed to the satisfaction of the sentencing court or 
substantially complied. Finally, it states that he must have at all times complied 
with 'the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on probation.' 
Compliance with most of the terms, or the major terms, is not sufficient."). 
Pinard did not establish that she complied with the terms and conditions of 
her probation "at all times," as required by I.C. § 19-2604(1) and (2). (See 
generally 4/25/11 Tr.) To the contrary, the record affirmatively showed, and 
Pinard did not dispute, that the district court previously revoked her probation 
after Pinard admitted violating it. (R., pp.50-53.) Consistent with the plain 
language of I.C. § 19-2604(1) and (2), and the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings 
in Schwartz and Thompson, the district court properly denied Pinard's motion to 
"expunge" or reduce her burglary conviction. (R., pp.69-72.) 
On appeal, Pinard acknowledges that she "is not eligible for relief." (See 
generally Appellant's brief.) Pinard has not attempted to distinguish Schwartz or 
Thompson or assign any specific error to the district court. This Court should 
thus affirm the district court's order denying Pinard's motion to "expunge" or 
reduce or her burglary conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Pinard's motion to "expunge" or reduce her burglary conviction. 
DATED this 24th day of February 2012 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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